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When is a warning statement “attached” to a contract? 
 
Section 366 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) 
provides that all contracts for the sale of residential property in 
Queensland (other than contracts formed on a sale by auction) should 
have “attached” as the first or top sheet a warning statement in the 
approved form.  The section does not explain or define the meaning of the 
word “attached”.  Further, the section does not contemplate the situation 
where the contract is faxed to a potential buyer for execution. 
 
The meaning of “attached” was recently considered by Muir J in MP 
Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven & Anor [2002] QSC 320 and 
although a fax was not involved the judgment is instructive. 
 
In this instance a warning statement was not stapled, pinned or otherwise 
affixed to the form of contract.  For the vendor it was argued that the 
attachment requirement in s366(1) was satisfied by the placement of the 
warning statement in a manila folder on top of the form of contract. 
 
According to Muir J the word “attached” may have either a broad or 
restrictive meaning. A broad approach may result in a warning statement 
being attached if it is accompanying or is associated with the contract.  
However, in its restrictive sense, “attached” would require some form of 
joinder, fastening or affixation.  His Honour stated that there was nothing in 
s 366 or s 367 which indicated a broad view quite the contrary “the aim of 
the sections appears to be to give prominence to the warning statement by 
ensuring that not only is it inseparable from the contract proper but that it 
is the first document to be seen by a prospective purchaser when perusing 
the contract.” 
 
His Honour also considered that the intent of the section could be 
complied with without the warning statement being stapled, pinned to or 
bound up with a contract.  Muir J gave the example of where the warning 
statement was the first of a number of loose sheets placed together in a 
folder and numbered or otherwise identified as the first sheet of the 
bundle.  The suggestion by his Honour being that the folder itself could 
serve as a unifying device to attach the bundle of papers together.  In that 
case his Honour considered it may be arguable that the warning statement 
was “attached’ to the other documents.  In the facts before the court that 
did not occur as the standard REIQ contract was used and written at the 
bottom of the front page of the contract was  “page 1 of 6” and the warning 
statement did not bear a number.  In addition there were other contractual 
documents in the folder. 
 
The following likely propositions can be drawn from the judgment: 
 
 Generally a warning statement will only be attached to a contract if 
it is physically joined to the contract. 
 
 A warning statement may be attached to a contract where the 
individual sheets of the contract are placed together in a folder and 
the warning statement is the first sheet, provided the face of the 
contract does not indicate that another page is the first page of the 
contract and provided further that the folder does not contain any 
other material unrelated to the contract in question. 
 
By analogy, a contract that is faxed with the warning statement clearly 
indicated as the first page of the contract and the first page of the fax may 
be regarded as attached to the contract by virtue of having been faxed as 
one document, but this position is by no means clear.  In this regard it is 
unfortunate that a method of communication commonly employed in the 
contract formation process is not expressly contemplated by the 
legislation. 
 
Although Muir J has indicated that it may be possible for a warning 
statement to be attached as the first page of a bundle of loose pages 
which all form one contract, each situation should be considered on its 
individual facts.  Physical joinder of the warning statement to the contract 
as the first or top sheet is clearly the prudent course of action that should 
be adopted. 
 
The decision also raised a further issue that will be of interest to 
practitioners.  Can the statutory right of termination under s 367 of 
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) be waived by the 
conduct of the buyer? 
 
For the vendor it was argued that the purchaser’s knowledge of its 
statutory right of termination combined with its later confirmation that the 
contract was unconditional constituted waiver. 
 
Waiver will occur where a person with knowledge of two inconsistent legal 
rights abandons one of those rights by acting in a manner inconsistent with 
that right.  The legal rights will only be inconsistent if neither one may be 
enjoyed without the extinction of the other and that extinction confers upon 
the elector the benefit of enjoying the other: Sargent v ASL Developments 
Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634 at 641. Justice Muir J considered that the right of 
termination conferred by s 367 was not waived by a buyer who with 
knowledge of the contravention of s 366 continues to perform the contract. 
The reasons for this conclusion were: 
 
 The right to terminate under s 367 and the right to continue with the 
contract were not inconsistent rights.  His Honour held that s 367 
gave the buyer a “right to terminate the contract at any time before 
the contract settles, irrespective of the nature and extent of the 
performance under the contract and irrespective of the party’s 
conduct by reference to it.” 
 
 The time of election did not arise until the time of settlement and a 
mere intention expressed by conduct not to terminate immediately 
does not divest the buyer of the right to terminate at a later date. 
 In the result, the potential buyer was successful in recovering from the 
vendor substantial legal and other expenses incurred after the contract 
was signed in accordance with s367(5) of the Property Agents and Motor 
Dealers Act 2000 (Qld). 
 
The decision not only provides guidance as to the application of the 
legislation but highlights the considerable care that needs to be taken by 
all parties associated with the contract formation process. 
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